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THE PROBLEM OF THE LOYALISTS IN 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
Historians have tended to approach the American Revolution 
from the perspective of its winners. They have tried to under-
stand the causes and consequences of the war in terms of the 
attitudes, perceptions and actions of the revolutionaries. 
Although this approach had been very fruitful, the focus on 
the reasons for a revolution has obscured the possibility that 
! 
any sensible i' right-thinking Ame'rican could have opposed the 
Revolution. There has long been an interest, however, in those 
colonists who did not support the Revolution. Recently, hist-
orians have sought to explain the motivation of these loyalists 
as a result of the characteristics and interests common to the 
social, economic, or geographical groups that were most frequently 
opposed to the Revolution. 
William Nelson, for example, suggested that rank and file 
loyalists tended to be members of economic or cul·tural minorities. 
Thus, their loyalism could be explained by their greater fear 
of dominance by a local majority than their fear of continued 
British rule. Nelson also studied the leaders of the loyalists, 
finding them to be distinguished from their ,more patriotic contemp-
oraries by a dependence on Britain for their political authority.l 
, 
Other historians, like Wallace Brown and Leonard Labaree, have 
focused on the loyalists' occupauions, government office holding 
and religious affiliations as import~nt characteristics. Finding 
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that the loyalists were frequently merchants, lawyers, royal 
officials and Anglicans they have suggested that these were the 
significant factors in their loyalism. The loyalists were, in 
this view, motivated by a combination of close ties to Britain 
and economic and political self-interest. 2 
Studies of the development of revolutionary feelings have 
suggested, however, that a different approach to the loyalists' 
motivations must be taken. Pauline Maier's study of the pre-
revolutionary period, for example, indicates that independence 
only became a goal of the radicals in the years immediately 
preceding the outbreak of hostilities; and that until this time 
almost everyone had been loyal to Britain. With the t:.ransformation 
of the radicals' goals "from resh;tamce to revolution" the colonists 
were faced with the choice of remaining loyal or becoming revolu-
tionary. She has suggested that, at this point in time, the 
question of political allegiance was 
not merely whether political ambition or economic 
interests caused loyalty or disloyalty, but how 
these or other relevant considerations ericouraged, 
permitted or retarded adherence to a revolutionary 
argument that was in its own terms rational and 
. compelling. 3 
Thus, the choice of some men to remain loyal despite the temper 
of the times must be studied in terms of the way their circum-
stances shaped their perceptions of the social and political 
issues surrounding the Revolution. 
Several historians have looked at individual loyalists, .. 
and, in so doing, have pointed to the complexity of their 
.. 
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motivations. The recent biographies of Thomas Hutch.tnson by 
Bernard Bailyn, and Jonathan Sewall by' Carol' Berkin,£or 
example, indicate that these meri'sloyalism was the result of a 
whole set of attitudes and opinions that they he'ld, ' and not just 
~ 
of their self-interest.· Robert Calhoon and Mary Beth Norton have 
both considered the perceptions of .larger groups of loyalists, 
finding , that this approach to the loyalists' mot.tvation is use-
I 
ful on a broader scale as well. 5 There have not ', how.ever, been 
any efforts to relate the group characteristics of the loyalists 
that Nelson, Brown, and Labaree havedocuineritedto this under-
standing of the loyalists ' perceptions of theissue~ surrouriding 
the ~~erican Revolution. 
Combining a study of the group characteristics of the loyalists 
with a consideration of the way these characteristics were related 
to their understanding of the revolution is not only possible, 
but very enlightening. I will use both of these method~ of 
studying the loyalists in the following case study of the Harvard 
graduates who became loyalists. 
. . 
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CHARACTERIZING THE HARVARD GRADUATES WHO BECAME LOYALISTS 
Why should we study the loyalists who attended Harvard College? 
In and of themselves these men are worth studying because of the large 
: i 
! . 
number of influential figures and political leaders among them. In 
addition, I hope to show that insights into their characteristics and 
, i 
motivati6ris can help to explain the larger question of loyalism in 
Massachusetts. 
Harvard Students 
The 206 loyalists who attended Harvard College in the classes 
graduating between 1722 and· 1771 were members of a select and privi-
leged group as a result of their liberal educatio~. A total of only 
1800 men attended Harvard College in these years, and the approximately 
1,200 living in the mid-1770's constituted less than half of one per-
cent of the population of Mass8.chusetts. 6 Among that part of the 
population eligible to have attended college, white males over 16, they 
were still only about two percent. 7 How can we characterize the young 
men ",]ho attended Harvard College? And . what was the effect of their 
education on their status within prerevolutionary Massachusetts? 
To begin with, Harvard students tended to be more urban than the 
popUlation as a whole. More than one-sixth of them were born in Boston 
and a similar number lived there (Table I) . Over the course of the 
century the percentage of Boston-born students declined from about 20 
percent to a low of 10.6 percent . . The population of Boston declined 
similarly relative to that of Massachusetts, however, and the pro-
portion of Boston born Harvard students remained about one and a half 
i 
times as large as the . proportion o~ Boston res'idents in the population 
of the Province (Table II) . 
• 
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Boston, the center of trade and goverrunent for the province, 
was the home of most of the political and economic eli teo. of Massachu-
setts. These groups were well represented among Harvard students, 
but young men of "more common ll origins also attended college . 
Samuel Eliot Me rison recognized this diversity, characterizing the 
students' .families as "fairly representative of the upper layers 
of New England. Merchants, magistrates and ministers furni s hed the 
large number, but there were a good many sons of plain farmers 
and artisans .•. ,,8 ~Jtorison did not; however· i provide any measure · 
of the relCl.tive numbers of these different students. 
A means of more precisely measuring the status· of the students 
is provided by the process of placing; by which each student was 
ranked within his class. While some of the details of the procedure 
used in placing remain unknown; there is general agreement about 
its broad outlines . Until 1712, seniority was determined on the 
basis of academic merito After this, there ·was a period of trans-
ition in which students were placed more and more on the' basis of 
the "presumed official or social r~nk" of their fathers. By 1749, 
familial prominence had become the sole criterion ggverning a 
student·s place within his class. 9 Thus, we can use the class 
rank of Harvard students as a measure of their relative prominence. 
The belief that the new students could and should be ranked 
according to their family status reflects a -basic assumption in 
eighteenth century Massachusetts that runs counter to the image 
of an increasingly democratic society. The same belief tnat there 
was a real and necessary social ordf:?I also found expression in 
i 
the assignment of seats in the town meeting house " where the 
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position of a man ' s seat was a i. symbolic indication of where he 
stood in the eyes of the community."IO Although , it is widely 
agreed that Massachusetts was quite democratic in the sense that 
most adult males were eligible to participate in the political 
process, recent studies suggest that there were widely accepted 
social distinctions that ' governed the political behavior of the 
"more common" men. For eighteenth century New Englanders,sQeiety 
was divided between "superiours and inferiours (sic), rulers. and 
11 ': " 
ruled, publick and private orders of men ••• " Men knew which of 
these groups they belonged to, and it seemed perfectly rea:senable 
, to express the reco_gnized ' social order in the ranking of each 
new class. 
There are some £urther clues which clarify the relationship 
, ,r , 
, - .... 
between cla-ss -rank and status in society as a - whole. -The College 
, s~ems to have distinguished between three categories of students 
in placing: the sons of civil magistrates and justices of the peace 
were ranked highest; 'sons of college graduates, ranked in the 
order in which they had received their degrees, followed them; 
and finally the sons of "more common" types filled the bottom 
places in the class. James Axtell has suggested that approximately 
ten percent of each class came from the first group, 20 percent 
from the second, and the remaining 70 percent of each class was 
, ' 12 
drawn from the "more common" ,sorts. The fact that 20 percent of 
each class was made up of the sons of college, graduates, ' a - group 
which constituted less than one percent of the population of 
Massachusetts, provides one indication that the upper layers of 
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New England society were substantially overrepresented. 
Placing was not simply a formality, but an important 
measurement of each student ' s relative prominence. The students 
were constantly reminded of their place: seniority governed the 
order in which the class would recite before the faculty,. seat 
and serve themselves at meals , sit in chapel, march in academic 
processions and appear.. in the College Triennial Catalogue. These 
distinc.:t.i.ons and other less tangible benefits derived from 
,0". 
'being placed nearer the top of the class were clearly seen by the 
College as desirable r sincaone of its standard punishments 
for ·breaches of the rules was the degradation of . the guilty .pax:ty 
one-"or more places untilreforrna-tion and penitence were demon·strated . 
The COIDments of Paine Wingate show that the students shared this 
opinion. "The scholars," said Wingate, "were often enraged beyond 
bounds £or their disappointment in their places, and it was some 
time before the class could be settled down to anacquiesence in 
their · allotment. ,,13 Thus, the judgement of social status conveyed 
by a student's place was very important to all involved. 
Although placing provides support for the conclusion that 
there were relatively many of the sons of the upper class among 
college graduates, it also shows that a significant part of each 
class was not ·drawn from the elite of the society. The recognition 
of the ability of young men from other strata of society is 
further suggested by the growth of scholarships in the eight~enth: 
century. While there had been virtually no financial aid in the 
seventeenth century" almost half of each classrecei ved some 
-8-
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assistance in the _1750's and 1760' s . - Thus, although Harvard 
students were frequently from prominent families, higher education 
was open to promising young menfrorn other segments of society. 
No matter what their social background was, however, the 
students were "socially ambitious and a coll~ge degree was the 
badge of their success . '11 l5~ Their education provided them with 
the training necessary to ente'r the ministry I law or medTc.ine, 
and avery large number of them did. The occupations ofal! 
Harvard graduates in classes ·between 1722 and 1771 are shown:in 
Table III. Close -to 60 perc~nt of the students entered one---or 
another profession, and 'close to a third became ministers. 
Despite the ro~e that a liberal education played in 
advancing the social status of the sons of less prominent families , 
.~. 
. -.# 
there are "Some indications that the opportunities available ~to-
them differed from those of their more prominent classmates. In 
particular, the less prominent graduates seem to have found the 
.. t h hIt' 16 h mlnlS ry _more open to t ern t an secu ar occupa Ions. . T e 
importance of inherited status is particularly clear in the 
effect it had on both election and appointment to public offices . 
Harvard graduates were well qualified for positions of 
political leadership by virtue of their education, and all signs 
are that their communities did in fact elect them to these 
positions relatively frequently. One . o f ever y s i x Harvard graduates 
ihthe yearsfrbm 1722 to 1771 was' e1"ected to .the Massachusetts 
. . ' . ' . 17 ' . 
General Court. Robert Zemsky has studied the patterns of 
leadership in the Massachusetts House of Repr~sentatiyes between 
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1740 and 1755, and his findings suggest that inherited status 
played a role in both election to the House, and leadership 
within the House. 18 In this time period, 70 college graduates, 
13 percent of the Representatives, were elected to the .House. Of 
the 62 that had attended Harvard, 44 had been placed in :the top 
.half of their classL 19 Thus, inherited status played a role in 
election to positions of political leadership. 
Within the House, . Zemskyfound that 60 percent of the .' 
college graduates he came "House leaders" while o.nly 13 percent 
o.t-- the c>-t:her Representative's reached this po.sitio.n. Amo.ng the 
Uarvard graduates a much higller propo.rtio.n o.f--thoseplaced in 
--
theto.p half of their class became leaders (73 percent) than was 
true for tho.se in the botto.m "half o£ their class (28 percent).20 
Thus, whi~e the less prominent _co.llege graduates still became 
leaders twice as o.ften as theno.n-college educated Representatives, 
they -achieved leadership positions less frequently than their 
mo.re prominentclassmate.s. Edward Cock found that a similar 
pattern prevaiJ:.ed in appointments to public o.ffice. Amo.ng the 
college graduates .that he considered, two. thirds of those who. 
may be called prominent as a result of holding an appo.inted o.ffice 
were the sons or near relatives o.r prominent men. 2l 
Harvard students were not representative o.f the full scope 
of the population o.f Massachusetts in the eighteenth century, .' 
being more frequently urban and pro.min~nt than was the norm-, but 
they were drawn fro.m a wide v.ariety ·o.f different so.cial .and 
e<;::o.no.mic o):,igins. Armed with a sense o.f ho.w .Harv~rd graduates 
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differed from the society they lived in, and the role they 
played in it, we are in a position to describe the loyalists who 
attended Harvard College. 
The Harvard Loyalists 
The 10-yalists , who attended Harvard· College shared rnan..y of the 
characteristics of .their patriotic or undecided classmatesI' but 
the loyalists differed froffi .9the,rHarvard graduates in ,a :itumber 
of significant ways. How they differed, and how they were -the 
same is revealed in a-detailed study of the biographies of 16.0 of 
the 206 identified loyalists who. attended Harvard between 1722 
and 1771.-22 The Harvard lO"yalistscan then be placed in ~he .. ~ " , 
~arger context, of Massa-chusetts loyalism through comparison 
with descriptions of the loyalists provided by the historians 
Nelson, Brown and Labaree. 
Among a highly -urban group, the Harvard loyalists were 
even more frequently of urban origin. ~ore than one quarter of 
them were born in Boston, and a similar number made the city 
their horne (Table IV). While the proportion of Boston born 
loyalists decreased during the century, they remained about 
one and a half times as likely as aLl Harvard students to be 
from Boston, and nearly three times as likely as all residents 
of Mas'sachusetts. , The loyalists born in Boston differed signifi- ' 
cantly in their social and ' economic origins and experiences from 
those born in rural co~unitiesland a charact~riza:tion of the 
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loyalists must take this into account. 
Boston was the center of commerce and government for 
Massachusetts, and as such it was the home of many of the large 
merchants and political leaders of the province . .In the eighteenth 
century,Boston ' s economy expanded both horizontally and vert i-
cally, creating greate!, extremes of wealth and poverty, as-well 
as a greater diversity of occupations than in the rural co:rr.rr.unlties 
of Massachusetts ~ ' 23 . Th~ Harvard loya'lists born in Boston came. 
from-more diverse social and economic circumstances than did 
those born in rural communities. Well over half of the loyalists 
born ,in Boston and surrounding communities were the sons of 
merchants, 32 percent, or government officials, 26 percent 
{Table V), while another 20 percent of the Boston:;'born loyalists 
were_ the sons of shopkeepers or craftsmen. Ministers'sons made 
up only a small fraction of the Boston born loyalists, whereas 
they predominated among the college-bound loyalists . from other 
areas. Only the sons of shopkeepers and craftsmen appeared in 
any number from both urban and rural communities. The social and 
, 
economic differences separating the urban and rural loyalists 
were reflected '-in -many aspects of their experiences, including: 
their residences , occupations, political participation and reli-
gious views. 
The more urban character of the loyalistsme~ntthatthey 
came more frequently from prominent families ,than was true ' of ,' 
Harvard students in general. This can be measured in the somewhat 
greater concentration of the loyalists in 'the upper half of their 
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class. Twenty percent of the loyalists were placed 
in the top ten percent of their class, while about half were 
placed in the top 30 percent (Table VI). The remainder of the 
loyalists were spread out fairly evenly throughout the other 
70 percent of their class, confirming the fact that the loyalists 
were nonetheless drawn from a spectrum of different social :c.lasses~ 
A comparison of the loyalists relative class rank wi:til: 
their fathers' occupations (Table VII) provides a clearer-under-
. 
standing of the interrela-tionship of urban birth ancL inheri±.ed 
status. The sons of appointed government officials, the most 
strongly urban group, were almost alway~ (80 percent) - placed in 
the top fiTth of their class, indicating a high degree of status . 
or -
-The other highly urban group, the '"Sons of merchants, were also 
frequently from prominent families, as the fact that over ha-lf 
-Cjf them were placed in the top fifth of their class shows. The 
sons of ministers, doctors and lawyers came from rural areas more 
often, and occupied a position of somewhat lower status, being 
placed, for the most part, in the middle ranks of their class. 
In contrast to these other groups, the sons of shopkeepers and 
artisans were of markedly lower status, being placed in the bottom 
40 percent of their class more than.. half of the time. Thus, among 
the loyalists ,the men of urban origins seem to have been mo·st 
.frequently · from -the extremes of status, occupying the .highest 
, -
or lowest places in their classes. The men -of rural origins 
tended, on the other hand, to fall closer to the middle of the 
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social spectrum of Harvard students • . 
Although the loyalists who attended Harvard College were 
more frequently professionals than their fathers (Table VIII), 
the occupations that they ' followed, and the communities that 
they lived in were strongly influenced by the interlocking: 
factors of their social, economic and geographic origins;~ A 
:high -percentage of the- Harvard graduates who became loyalis~ 
returned to the area - that they carne from (Table IX), but the. 
strength of this correlation varied a great deal. A3,most 70 percent 
of those born in Boston r-eturned there# for example ' . while less. 
· than half of those born in communities between 15 and 30 miles 
from Boston settled in this area. For the most part, the men 
.who left theseou.tlying communities settled further west of 
Boston. This pattern was- the result of the different sorts of 
opportunities that were open to the sons of rural minister.s and 
professionals, and to those of urban merchants and government 
officials. 
Almost all of the loyalists entered one of the professions 
or became merchants (Table X), but inherited status and wealth 
played a significant role in determining precisely what path 
they followed after Harvard. The sons of prominent and wealthy 
men frequently followed their fathers ' footsteps. More than 60 
percentoL the sonS of doctors and lawyers entered their fathers' 
professions, . while 60.9 percent of the merchants' sons became . 
merchants. (Table XI). As these occupations were largely carrieo 
out in and around Boston, these men tended to remain where they 
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were born. In contrast , the sons of shopkeepers and craftsmen 
became ministers or schoolmasters twice as frequently as the 
other loyalists , and only rarely became merchants or lawyers~ 
Timothy Fuller, the grandfather of the feminist and 
transcendentalist Margaret Fuller, is typical of these men 
from less prominent families. Born in Middletown, Massachu&et-::s, 
in 1739, he came from an undistinguished background. We knw 
.' " .. 
nothing of his .father's occupation, and he was placed toward 
bottom of his class. After recei17inghisB.-A.~ Fuller kept 
the Lexington school for s~veraT year_s., until he received ' l1i.s 
second degree. Following -this, he supplied several pulpits before 
accepting ·a call to Princet.on, which Shipton described as a 
"raw frontier parish," and was ordained there in 1767. 24. F-ull.er ' s 
?" . . ..... 
westward movement, and that of -men like him, was the result of 
their choice of the ministrYIand the fact that the greatest need 
for ministers was in the western part of the Province . 
A c.omparison of the occupations of the loyalists with those 
of all Harvard students in this period provides a clear picture 
of the way in which the loyalists differed from their patrio.tic 
and their undecided classmates. It has been suggested thatJn..ercnants 
and la\>.yers were prominent among the groups that were most strongly 
loyalist, and the Harvard loyalists provide some support for this 
idea. 25 The Harvard loyalists became merchants · and lawyers a~ .. 
- . -' ' . , 
.almost · twice the overall rat.e for · Harvard student·s. • . Thirty-one 
percent of the ·loyalists were merchants, and another 20 percent 
lawyers, as opposed to figures of 17 percent and 10 percent .:-
-15-
respectively among all Harvard students. Similarly, there 
. 
were fewer ministers among the loyalists (21.3 percent) than 
there were among all graduates (about 33 percent). Thus, the 
Harvard loyalists stand. out as wealthy, urban merchants and 
secular professionals wi thin a group which already contai.ned 
a high concentration of these -types. While these were . the 
predominemt character.i.s~ics ~f the group, they were not· the 
- . . 
~only- · -ones. Among·=tne~:Harvard graduates who became loyalists 
there was. a-substantial -minori tywho,like Fuller I came from 
less prominent families; frequently entered the ministry, settled 
in rural areas, and failed to conform to most generalizations 
about the loyalists . . 
The range of social types amo~gthe Harvard loyalists 
is particularly clear when we ._c.onsider the extent of their involve-
ment ingovernment. -Nearly half of the loyalists held either an 
elected or appointed political position. More than ene-quarter 
held tvlO offices and twentY-five, or 16 percent, held three or 
26 .more. 
Most studies of the loyalists have found thatreyally appointed 
officials were quite consistently loyal. Th~ir loyalism has 
usually been explained in terms of their close contacts with 
Britain, and their vested interest in maintaining order. 27 The 
number of royally appointed officials among the Harvard .~ loyalists. 
provides . a . good measure of the importance of thi sfactor. -TWerity- · 
one of the Harvard loyalists (13 percent) held positions from 
customs officer on up to tjlat of Lieutenant Governor and . 
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Governor (Table XII). These men gained their positions and 
advanced within the royal government as a result of their trans-
Atlantic connections and influence. The case ·of James Honeyman, 
in the class of 1729, illustrates how the system worked. His 
father was an Episcopalian minister, but he inherited land and 
a degree of social prominence from his mother's family. Hone.yman 
presented Rhode Is1and·'·s case before a board of royal commissioners ... 
in a boundary dispute with Massachusetts. His name was known in 
England, where the newly appoint~Nava10fficer and Judge of 
Vice Admiralty requested that he-be appointed deputy Naval 'Officer , 
in 1743. Honeyman became closely associated with royal officers·, 
eventually advancing.to an appointment as "King ' s Advocate of 
the Court.of Vice Admiralty ... ,,28. 
Patronag.e also-operated within the Province , where the 
Governor's power of appointment to a number of offices was used 
to cement political ties and recognize prominent citizens. These 
offices - -included militia officers and judica1 positions 
, f ' , f h ' t' t' 29· rang~ng rom Just~ces 0 te peace to superl,or cour JUs "l,ces . 
Almost 15 percent of the Harvard loyalists had been appointed 
to governmental positions other than justice of the peace , and a 
huge proportion, almost 40 percent, were made justices of the 
30 peace. Thus a significant portion of the loyalists were closely 
connected to the royal and provincial governments through appoint-
ments to government offices. 
Traditionally , historians have cited the large number of 
loyalists who helo. appointe.d positions. in the royal and provincial. 
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governments as evidence that they lacked local political popularity 
and support. William Nelson, for example , argued that among the 
political elite of the colonies the loyalists were distinguished 
from the leaders of the revolutionary party by their need of 
support from Britain, "since they could not gain sufficient support 
3' . in America to hold power." ... In contrast to this picture,. however , 
the Harvard graduates who became loyalists were also frequently 
elected to positions of leadership by their communities. 
Thenurnber of Harvard loyalists elected to the House of 
:Representatives or positions of town leadership, such as town 
meeting moderator or selectman, indicates that they were frequently 
I:espected and trusteamembers of their communities. The selectmen 
and town meeting moderator, for example , were chosen by election 
and were., almost invariahly ,members of a well known group of· the 
most emin.ent ~men# "men whose worth was recognized by all the 
inhabitants of the town." 32 Twenty-three of the Harvard loyalists 
(14.4 percent) were elected to positions of town leadership; 
and 32 (20 percent) were elected to the House of Representatives, 
a slightly higher proportion than we found among all Harvard 
graduates. Although the loyalists had strong ties to the provincial 
administration, they were also men who were often viewed by their 
communities as qualified leaders of society. 
Not only were the Harvard loyalists frequently among the 
recognized leaderS of their communitieS~buta. large number of 
those who held appointecf o£fices ,~hom we might suppose to have 
been dependent on British support, were also community leaders. 
-18-
Of the 52 Harvard loyalists who held more than one politica~ 
office , 35 held at least one by appointment of the royal government 
or the Governor. Seventeen of these, nearly half, had also been 
elected to the House of Representatives or a position of town 
leadership.33 Thus, we may conclude that a significant e1ement 
of the provincial elite was grounded in popular support •. 
Although loyalists of all types held political off Lees., 
these offices were far from evenly distributed among the · .c4-~ferent 
social, ec;:onomic and geographic·types that we have identified. 
Among the lawyers- and merchants- there were a large number of office 
holders, 57 percent and -£7 percent respectively, while only nine 
percent 0·£ the -ministers held political positions (Table. XIII) • 
-Once again , we see that there was no single loyalist experience 
.,--. .. 
wi 
reflecting the different social, geographic:::, and economic origins 
of the loyalists who attendedH-arvard College. 
Although Anglicans did not make up a majority of the Harvard 
graduates who became loyalists, they were present in a much higher 
proportion (26.9 percent) than among all Harvard students (10.2 
percent).34 Theloyalism of the Anglicans, like that of royal 
Dfficials, can in part be explained by the conne~tions with 
Britain that is adherents had. What, however, was the appeal of 
the Church of England to a Massachusetts born Congregationalist? 
Wallace Brown has suggested that Anglicanism had asocial appeal 
fdr the fashionabl.e ,- weal thy I urban classes, -Inaking ~onversibn 
an indication of a desire to emulate British manners on the part 
of these classes. 35 
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Almost one-third of the Anglicans among the Harvard loyalists 
were converts, and the reasons for their conversion provide an 
opportunity to investigate the relationship between Angli·canisro 
. 
and loyalism. The 13 converts may be divided into two g~onps 
. . 
of rougply equal size. In one group, we find men who seem to have · 
taken.the -religious issues separating the two faiths fairly 
- . 
lightly. · Supporting ·Brown~ s th.esis, men like Thomas Bulfinch 
and John . Bo.:r::eland, both of whom married into A!lglican families,. /> -
seem to hav-e been motivated by almost purely social concerns. In 
.Bo:t'eland '-s -,- case, "the charming. society" of his wife' s family 
.. . 36 
arew him into the Anglican church. - This ·group was, by and 
large, wealthy, urban and prominent. Many of its members were 
._ i> " 
government officials of some stature, and included several .justices 
of the peace, the Sheriff ofBuffolk County and the Naval Officer 
for Falmouth, Maine. 
In contrast to these men, -the .other group was characterized 
by a much more religious and philosophical set of concerns. In 
this group we find · pious and devoted men like ~'i'illiam Clarke, 
who converted on entirely religious grounds. These more religious 
converts came largely from the less prominent, rural graduates, 
who made up the other part of the Harvard loyalists . They were , 
with the exception of Samuel Waldo, poorer than the men who 
converted for more social reasons, arid were nluch less frequEmt.:l.Y 
office holders. While the number ·of cases we have examined 1S 
too small to be conclusive, the division of the Anglican converts 
. " '" .. . 
, ' -,:, . 
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between urban and rural, and mere and less preminent types 
illustrates seme ef the differences in eutleek that separated 
these two. greups . 
Frem this examinatien of the characteristics efthe lfarvard 
leyalists several significant'peintsbecome clear. First, within 
a greup that already contained a ,relatively high cencentratien 
ef men frem the upper -layer~ of seciety, the Harvard leyali$ts 
centained even more. This wasreflect.ed _in a number efways::they 
: . . : ', . 
became merchants,_ government officials and lawyers mere ~requentiy 
than their ,patri otic or ,undecided classmates, they settled~ in 
-Beston and ' its surreundings mere frequently, and they were -more 
often Anglicans. In all of these respects, they confo.rm to. the 
-way mosth±storians "have described the loyalists. But, second, 
r -· 
net all of the loyalists who. attem'C1ed Harvard may be described 
as urban, prominent, nerchants, ...:pelitical leaders · or secular 
prefessionals. A quarter of them settled in cemmunities more than 
30 miies from Boston , more than one-third were placed in the 
bottom half of their class, and mere than one-fifth were ministers~ 
While the propertion of these gro.ups ameng the Harvard loyalists 
was smaller thanameng all Harvard students, it was far from 
insubstantial. To. understand themetivations of the leyalists , 
the reasons why both of these social types became leyalists 
must be explained. 
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THE MOTIVATIONS OF THE HARVARD LOYALISTS 
Thus far we have viewed the loyalists with the hindsigbt 
provided by two-hundred years. With the ·accomplished fac.t ~o:f 
the American Revolution it is easy to. divide the colonists into 
groups that ..su:pported ~nd opposed independence from England .when 
this b~came an issue in the years immediately preceding the":' war. 
The .possibility of American independence was not an issue untjl 
1174,how"eve~, and-',p6st"':'17-Y4affiliations and opinions cannot 
be projected backwards~pon · the prerevolutionary period. ,,37 To 
c.all someone a lO..YEllist · prior to 1774 is-to say that he took a 
.. po~i tion which identified him wi th . the positions of other men 
-·who. would become loyalis.ts., and wbi;:h placed him in opposition 
to those men who Tea the colonial resistance and later the 
Revolution. Thus., the important -questions about the loyalists' 
motivations are: What were the issues that div1ded the future 
loyalists and revolutionaries? And what distinguished the loyalists ' 
perceptions of· these issues frOm those of the radicals? 
Until 1774, the loyalists were largely responding to the 
political and public actions of the radicals. As Table XIV shows, 
before 1774, more than 70 percent of the actions of the Harvard 
loyalists which can, with highsight, be identified as indications 
of futl,lre loyalism were of three kinds: criticis~ of.the raq..icais, 
resistance to their prQtests, and po.1itical opposition . to their 
initiatives. A number of future loyalists were critical, for 
example , of the unnecessary extremism qf public protests like 
-22...; 
the Stamp Act riots. Such protests were actively resisted~y 
government officials who had to enforce unpopular British policies , 
and merchants who did not wish to take part in the non-importation 
movement. Finally, some of the Harvard loyalists indicated their 
posi tions by vot_ing ._against radical resolutions in town meetings 
-and in the House of Representat.ives. None of these actions implied -
" .. .. ,' .. . 
a particular position on American independence, since atthi.:stime . __ 
almost no one favored rebellioIl.Only after 1774, when a subs-tant-ial 
number of people favored independence, didtheloyali-sts begin 
to ·identify themselves explicitly through their opposition to--
this goal. 
Tbe early political issues that divided the future loyalists 
r --
and revolutionaries centered around"'a growing conflict. between 
Thomas Hutchinson, an important £igure in Massachusetts politics 
and later governor of the province, and the leaders of the 
Massachusetts House of Representatives, particularly James Otis, Jr. 
and John Adams. Although the 'issue that divided the two factions 
in Massachusetts had to do with the degree of participation of 
the lower classes in political decisions, both factions were led 
by members of the upper strata of the society. Following the usual 
pattern of political conflict at this time, neither faction 
could be termed a "populist " movement on the basis of its leader-
h- . 38 Slp. 
Around the middle of the eighteenth century, a group of 
political leaders in Boston that centered around James Otis , Sr. , 
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Royall Tyler , and Oxenbridge Thatcher was advocating positions 
that "gave credence to laboring-class views and regarded as 
entirely legitimate the participation of artisans and even 
39 laborers in the political process." They were opposed by 
a group of merchants and political figures that · included Thomas 
Hutchinson, who wanted to reduce the chaos that they felt. was 
inherent in the involvement of these classes in the ·city's 
governance. The Hutchinson faction wished to replace elected 
offices wi-th aPRointea ones, and hand over management of the · 
~ . .. .. . " " " 40 
city to the wealthy and well-born. . Whe~ the newly appointed 
Governor, Francis Bernard, arrived in Massachusetts in 1760, he 
found the province "divided . into parties so nearly equal that 
it would have -been madness for meta put myself at . "the "head of 
-ei ther of them. ,,41 
Bernard 'os actions did not, however I help to calm the 
poli tical...si tuation. In fact, fuel was added to the conflict 
in 1760, when he appoint-ed Hutchinson to the chief justiceship 
that had become vacant as a result of the death of Stephen 
Sewall. As Bernard knew, but chose to ignore, this position had 
been promised to James Otis, Sr., by Governor Shirley. Of parti-
cular importance to Bernard in making this decision was his 
concern over Otis ' political alliances and his seeming unwilli!lg-
_ness to prosecute violations of the navigation laws. Hutchinson, 
qn " theoth~r hand i seemed caromi tted tomaintai~ing ""close-ties · " 
with Engl~nd.42" 
-24-
Bernard ' s slight to Otis provoked his son, James, Jr., 
and John Adams to mount a series of vicious attacks upon 
Hutchinson over the years . ,AI though these did not resuLt in 
any immediate uproar, they began "the transformation of 
Hutchinson's reputation from ,that of an unimpeachable 'if 
conservative ' leader of the Anglo-American' establishment' to 
that of a sinister -manipulator of secret forces. ,,43 This 
-
transiformation would be along time in the making, and no one , 
could have judged its consequences at the time •. Nonethe:l,ess, 
the men 'who were attract'ed 'to: the provincialadministrat1:xm ' 
in the early 1760' s, ,and who became Hutchinson' s defenders 
in this dispute wC!uld eventually become loyalists. 
Jonathan Sewall, a rising young lawyer who had graduated 
.r ' ' :, ~' 
from Harvard in 1748., and a 'member of the provincia'l elite 
through his prominent relatives, was one of those who gravitated 
-.. - . . . - . 
toward Hutchinson. ' His study ' of the law under Chambers Russell 
and bis, close connection with Edmund Trowbridge, both friends 
of Hutchinson, predisposed him to the administration side. vlith 
the political establishment of Massachusets divided into two 
competing factions, his decd:sion was highly pragmatic. 
to move to otis's camp would be to lose his patrons; 
to remain loyal would deepen their [the administration'~ 
attachment to him. And surrounded by enemies, Bernard 
would be certain to take more immediate note of a 
talented young friend.44 
-Sewall was soon rewarded fC?x: his supporto'fthe a&ninist~ation ' 
with a commission as a justice of the peace. with the passing 
of time, his attachment to the administration would win him 
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the position of attorney general and several royal appointments~ 
Sewall, like other supporters of the administration, was 
forced to take a stand in opposition to the radicals in the 
ensuing- imperial crises despite his fundamental agreement with 
them. The Stamp Act, in 1765, was the first such crisis -which 
brought imperial issues into the domestic political debate. 
While almost all Americans " opposed the A.ct, none advocated ,: " : 
-.. : ... :. 
indepen~~nce • . A-rf:rroughafew people believed that the Act repre-
sented -a :cQncert.:~d- des-ign ag~inst the colonies, theoverwhetming 
majority felt that if this- was so it was the work of people 
outside of Parliament. _Thus, resistance was directed toward 
..... .... . . . -"._. 45 
imperial reform, and not revolution • . 
Political leaders were split, however, over the form that 
resistance should take. 46 While ~~~ provincial administration 
felt that the Act shoulabeprotested, they could pot advocate 
di-sobeying it. Populariyelected leaders, on the other hand, 
favored carrying on business. without -cthe use of stamps, in 
defiance of the Act. This tactic forced the administration's 
supporters to remain silent rather than be associated with 
the means of protest of the radicals. Sewall, for ' example, did 
not approve of the Stamp Act any more than its vocal protestors , 
but he remained silent because the public opposition was 
directed-' against both the Act and its enforcement. In the 
increasiIlglycritical atIIlosphere of then'ext few years,-5ewall 
\;,as an object:. 'of attack as a result of his growing ties to the 
administration . 47 
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Se\va1l seems to be fairly typical of those Harvard graduates 
'who first be.came identified as loyalists at this time .. Four-
fifths of the Harvard loyalists who first opposed the radicals 
between 1761 and 1767 held some political position, and 55. 
percent occupied :atleast ' one appointed office in ' either the 
provincial or royal government (Table'X'V~, Thus , the early 
loyalists were predominantly' government men who supported 
.British authority despite their distaste for the measuresfr 
required. 
The tactics of the radicals in the years fo.llowing the 
Stamp Act further separated the executive and legislative branc'hes 
of tha..:Massachusetts government , and cemented the factional 
allegiances that had been formed. Continuing to believe in±he 
, .... .;;, , 
benevolence o.f , the King, the radicals attributed~ oppressive 
British· po1icies to the evil designs o.f royal officials 'in the 
Colonies. They attacked these officials for their ' corru}?tio.n and 
theit':efforts to subvert the colo.nists' freedom. Combined with 
appeals to. the public to o.ppose tyranny, these attacks succeeded 
in making royal o.fficials the objects of increasing animosity . 
Governor Bernard, one of the subj ects of these attacks, 
wrote bitterly to Lord Shelbourne about them: 
To the original system of humbling the government and 
weakening its authority by constant opposition to 
the governor and making his seat uneasy and precarious 
he , [James. Otis, Jr.J has added a malicious., '. virulent .' 
and unre1enting , animosity'against. the persons employed 
in the government. 49 , . "_ . 
As they attributed the radica1s ' attacks to private malice 
and a desire for personal political advancement, government 
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officia~s and their supporters could only feel "UlJjustly slandered. 
To them the radicals appeared as basemen intent on their own 
gain even at the cost of ups~tting the stable political order; 
but with no sign of the coming revolutionary upheaval, it 
was still possible for the administration's supporters to 
believe tnat tempers would eventually cool and society-would 
return:.~·to i tSJ;'~ightful order. 49 Their efforts to protec-t- .:the 
established, deferential political order would appear as . -- . 
loyalist-acts only ·. in retrospect. 
Th-e: condemnation of appeals .to the public by the supporters 
of·· the administration grew out of their entire political philo-
sophy. Believing that deference to the well-born and capable 
,.,asa necessary part of good goVernment, they glorified the 
B~i tish fOrnl o.f government as the world's greatest political 
achievement. Jonathan Sewall exemplifies their thinking. Early 
in his life, Sewall developed a conviction that "the paternal 
care of the majority by a privileged but responsibility-laden 
minority was rational, necessary and productive of social 
harmony.n SO He developed and elaborated upon this view in the 
course of his published responses to attacks on Bernard and 
Hutchinson in the radical press. For Sewall there were only 
three political al terna ti ves open to human society:· anarchy, 
tyranny, and Brit~sh constitutional government.· By balancing 
the two extremes, British government arrived at the limits of 
perfection allowed by man ' s own imperfection. The real danger 
-28-
to political liberty in the colonies, he believed, came not 
from the King, but from the possibility of anarchy that the 
. 51 
efforts of popular political leaders threatened to bring about. 
Sewall's political position thus combined an abstract 
appreciation for .the British form of government with a concrete 
set of aristocratic attitudes and perceptions. HisloyaJ:ism 
was the result· of his negative reaction to the radicals.' tactics, 
growing out of -hls ·distaste for popular involvementin4e¢±sions 
that ought to be left to the :leaders of the society. This-same 
distaste for the tumult .thatthe radicals created seems to 
explain .the loyalism ofa number of the other Harvard loyalists. 
Robert Auchmuty (Class 6£ 1746), for example, criticized the 
radical leaders and tbeir followers in 1770: .--. 
~. 
Peraons-o.f-themost -abandon'd character, warmly espousing 
what is erroneously called·the interest of the people 
are almost the objects -o£ their adoration. · Such,: however 
before despised, as' selfish and base, now have an ..arbi-
trary sway in the town' of Boston. They, back'd by a 
wrong headed deluded populace, are the tyrants of 
-the times. 52 
Thus, while the effect of these early "political" loyalists ' 
views was to place them in support of British actions, it was 
largely as a result of their reaction to the domestic political 
conflict, and not because of their support for British policy. 
In the years following· 1767, political issues remained 
important, but the scope of the conflict expanded to include 
. . . . 
men wi thli ttle 9r no connection totheprovi~c~aLgov~rn.ment •. 
The radicals were institutionalizing their methods of resistance 
in . these y~ars, establishing conununicatiolJ.s . betweenthe conunittees 
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that had formed in different communities , and forming associations 
to enforce restrictions on imports. All of these actions would 
eventually res~lt in the birth of an alternative source of 
political authority, a sort of publicly supported " revo1.u-
. 53 tionary" shadow government. 
One aspect of this organizing process was the use of 
popu1ar1y- elected bodies , including .theMassachusetts .:General 
Court, and tow~_:-H'~etings l as vehicles of opposition to -'tihe __ .
. ... ..- ," 
proviri.cial administration. Many of the men who became 10ya:J..ists 
in the late 1760'~ -dia so in reaction' to these tactics. The 
men · who were affected by these tactics were less closely tied 
" , -' 
to-the-administ-rat:ion than were ' the earlier loyalists. Only 
5 of the 19 Harvard loya'lists (26.3 percent) who emerged in 
this period were provincial offTcia1s r and only 1 (5.3 percent) 
was a royal official (Table XV). In contrast, these figures 
were 40 and 45- percent respectively for the loyalists who 
emerged before l.7'67 .. 
In 1768, the House of Representatives wrote a Circular 
Letter to communities throughout the colonies encouraging 
their resistance to the Townshend duties. This effort to use 
the legislature as a forum for the radica~s' views provoked 
the resistance of a number 6f the Harvard loyalists. Governor 
Bernard called upon the House to rescind the letter, which it 
ref"used to do, despite a core of administration supporters. One 
. . . 
6f the men who ' voted to rescind the letter w·q.s .Wi1liam Browne 
of Salem. Browne, who had graduated in 1755, came from an 
',..".. 
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extremely wealthy family and had been appointed a justice of the 
peace in 1760. In 1762, he had been chosen to represent Salem 
in the House of Representatives, where he was on good tenns with 
.. . 54 
'both- the Hutchinson and Otis factions. 
Although Sal-em had instructed him to oppose rescinding. the 
Circular Letter, Browne voted in favor of rescinding it~ -This 
earned hirrithe censure of .the town, and lost him his seat: at 
the next election. The adriiinistration did not let his ' ~l,lpport ' .'. 
" ', ' 
.' 
go unrewarded, however. In 17·79, he was appointed to the. Essex 
'''- -:, " : .;~ 
-
Court of Common pleas and, in' 1771-, he was made . a co16nel-of 
. . 
the First Essex Militia. From this point on he seems to have 
been -drawn ever lllore deeply into the administration's circle. 
He warmly welcomed General Gag~_when he came to Salem in 1774, 
. VI 
and enterta,ined him, rt was ·said,with tea purcnased from 
. : 55 
Richard Clarke 'despite the radicals' boycott. 
Browne was not without his supporters in Salem, however. 
A number of men, including William pynchon (Class of 1743) 
opposed the town meeting's censure of Browne. Pynchon, a son 
of the highly revered pynchons of Springfield, settled in Salem, 
where he .read law and became a member of the bar. In 1761, he 
was appointed a justice of the peace, but rose no further 
than that within the government. He does not seem to have 
suffered for his support of Browne in 1768, but his signature 
Oil the lawyers' testimonial to Hutchinson· and a letter .of 
welcome to Gage, both 'in l7 7 4, made him an . object of popul·ar 
abuse. Despite withdrawing to Nantucket for a period to avoid 
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the violence directed at him, he later chose to return to 
. . h · ' 5~ Salem, and rema1ned there throughout t e Revolut10n. 
Pynchon's diary from the war years is revealing of the 
attitudes and perceptions that must have motivated his 
loya1ism. He remained enough of a patriot to term word of 
a British victory at Ticonderoga as "bad news", despite 
harassment ·that prompted him to describe his situation- i rr.. 
thes-e :'d-ismal we:r.ds: 
We cr.aw1 about . and exist, but cannot be said to 
truly live-• .l:tis ·said we have full enjoyment of. 
ouriiberty-,but where is the proof of it?57 
On- the : other hand, he was -critical of the radical 
leaders, believing that - their -- selfish interests were the 
cause o£ the Revolution, and doubtful about the possibility 
-., 
of :asuccessfuldemocratic gove!nment, believing that the people 
were n-either wise nor virt.uous enough to make one work.58 On 
.heariI~g. of--the Declaration o£ Independence ,he wrote: · 
Query, the ·consequences of · this measure. God's 
chosen people, though governed- by himself, desired 
a King of their own; he gave them a King in his anger. 
We Americans,'God's favorite people,' desiring no 
King, have set ours. aside; but wiser than the 
Israelites, who, having nothing did every man what 
was right in his own eyes, we have preferred many 
to one ••• 5.9 
His doubts about the possibility of a popular governmen-t 
uncheqked by any other forces were only reinforced by his 
experience with inflation during the Revolution. He saw the 
failure of., popular government in ·the." economic anarchy of -the 
era . 
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The acts of state absolutely prohibit .every kind of 
depreciation of the paper currency; either by words 
or actions; yet every trader, huckster, marketman 
and peddler with open mouths, unitedly declare and 
publickly (sic) say it is of little or no value ••• 60 
Pynchon's doubts about democratic government were similar to 
those of Sewall. They, and other men of similar views, came 
to oppose 'the radicals because they believed in the need .for 
a stably organized deferential government, protected against 
the excesse.s of popular passion. AsPynchon' s case sugge$:ts , 
. . 
these conservative political views were not limited to members 
of the provincial elite, but ' extended to men with only a 
p.eripheral involvement in the government. 
In the _years after 1767, the radicals ' tactics also 'hegan 
to impin-ge upon men with no 'political involvement . . These men, 
who held . no political positions? were responding to a different 
set of issues than, the "political" loyalists. Ministers o,f 
inland communities and seaport merchants made up most of the 
Harvard loyalists with little or no political involvement. 
Between 1767 and 1773, two Congregationalist ministers 
emerged as opposing the radicals (Table XV). Both of them carne 
to public attention because of their criticism of what they 
believed -to be the extremism of the radicals, and their 
advocacy of greater moderation. Rural ministers concerned with 
poli tical issues outside of their own communi ties were the, 
e'xception to the rule, however. 140st rural communities were 
preoccupied with their' own internal divisio'ns in these -Jear~, 
and gave little if any notice to the imperial issues that 
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embroiled Boston politics. 
The merchants who emerged in the years after 1767 shared 
the "political" loyalists' fears of popular excesses , but for 
different reasons. These merchants, as evidenced by their lack 
of political offices, and in some cases their avoidance ,of them, 
were not particularly interested in government. What concerned 
them,ana- impinged upon them ehoughtoforce them to ch-oose -
sides in the po-l::itical conflict was the growth and _ enforc€l-nent ,-
-0£ non-::importation agreements. The cases of Nathaniel Rogers- -{Class 
of 1755} and Wi1l-iam Vassall (Class of- 1733) suggest the rang-e~ 
- - -
of- impact that non-importation had on merchants, and their 
,reactions to it. 
Nathaniel Rogers -was the son of a wealthy Boston merchant 
who was related to most of the prominent families in the 
provinc'e. After his parents' death, he was raised by his uncle 
Thomas Hutchinson. A convert to Anglicanism, the religion of 
his wife, he moved in the highes~ social circles of Boston. 
In the early 1760's, Rogers' position on trade restrictions 
imposed by the British placed him in substantial agreement with 
the radicals. He was responsible for the reprinting of a 
seventeenth-century essay by William Wood, entitled "New England ' s 
Prospect," for which he wrote an introduction that so closely 
para11e-1ed the radicals ' position on British tariffs that it has 
beehattributed to James otis. He was, however, growing more 
fearful of the radicalS ' use of 'inob ' violence. By sepb:imber, 1765 , 
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he was concerned enough that he wrote to Thomas Hutchinson 
supporting the employment of British Regulars to prevent 
. 1 61 Vl.O ence. 
Rogers mostly wanted to be left alone to pursue his 
own fortune, as his advocacy of moderation in response ~to the 
Townshend Act in 1768 indicates: "Were we to adopt mode~ate 
- ~ ,40- •• 
" : ., 
and prudent measures ," he wrote in a letter to .the -Boston cNews":': .... 
Letter , "all . our past warmth and heat would be forgot;~nd the -. c 
Act would be repealed." When . the radicals' efforts-to block 
. - ". . ' " 
the importa±ion of British goods became an obstacle to his· 
financial activities, he simply ignored them. His defiance 
of the non-importation agreement was revealed , however, when 
$' -
the Boston Chronicle publishedt1'le import records of a number 
of Boston merchants- in 1769. 62 
As a result, Rogers, and several other merchants who were 
also named, came under intense public pressure to conform. A 
meeting of merchants resolved that they were "obstinant and 
inveterate enemies of their country, and subverters of the 
rights and liberties of this continent ," and denied them all 
commercial dealings and common civility.63 In a.ddition, they 
made life miserable for Rogers in other ways, covering his house 
with what he described as the "vilest filth of the vilest vault." 
Rogers expressed a determination not to submit to the "arbitrary 
·will · of lawless tyrannical men ," . but he was convinced by .his· 
friends that he should give in to the mob ' s demands for his 
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t ' 64 . '1770 d h' f self-preserva 10n. H1S death, 1n , spare 1m urther 
harassment. 
In contrast to Rogers ' rather militant resistance of 
the mob, William Vassall seems to have passed through the years 
of the non-importation movement silently and innocuou-sly~. Vassal! 
was born into a very wealthy family. His father sent him and . 
his.prother to Harvard as :Fellow Commoners, which, for --the.. -gift · 
of two ·.:- f;)i~ver tankar~s -and twice -the ordinary tuition, entitled--
them to eat at t!J.ehead -t;:.able, and gave them several other mihOr 
privileges. vassa;t.l :: show~d ' li~tleinterest in political office, 
occupying himself with t.hemanagement -of his Jamaican .plantation 
and - the social -life of -t:he~irc.1eof Anglican inunigrants in 
· 65 Boston. 
: Living in affluence in hi.sBoston mansion~ and owning one 
of the 22 carriages in · -that .• city, Vassall seems to have been 
quite content to remain withdrawn from public events. Although 
he was named as an importer at the same time as Rogers, he seems 
to have avoided .popular resentment, and it was later noted that 
his imports were intended for personal consumption. He was 
nevertheless concerned about the possible inconvenience that the 
non-importation movement could cause. In 1770, he wrote to his 
son- in-law ~ and London agent, James Syme: "We are here in a 
very disagreeable situation as to importing goods from England ••• " 
and advised him to exercise prudence in repl~ing to any queries 
about -his trade with America. 66 This concern soon passed, however, 
and the bulk of his letters in the following years deal with 
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managing his plantation and his son William, Jr., in London., 
. 67 
whom he admonished for being overly fond of, gaming and women. 
It waS not until 1774 that public affairs again intruded 
in William Vassall's life, and .this time they seemed very 
thr.eatening. Writing to Syme in 1774 about the closing of 
Boston Harbor, '. he proposed to remove himself from that city ' 
to Bristol " ... till ,near Christrnass by which time we hope 
things will returri to their former peaceable state. But-if things 
should continue in their present unsettled state, we propose , 
-
to remove to England :this ' time twelverrionth.~,68 Despite continued 
turbulence~ . . Vassall maiI!ta±ned_ himself in style ,importing 
finery from England through neighboring ports, sinceBC)ston 
·was closed. 69 The situation continued to deteriorate,' however , 
.r -
and he inched toward ~eaving for1:ngland, but he -.Still. hope-d 
that an accomodation ,could ber.eached. 
I impatiently wait to hear the determination of ,the 
, Contirien-tal Congress. If they should happily agree 
on an accornodation with [the] mother country I shall 
with great pleasure return to dear Boston .•. Bu:t if 
the present distress ana unhappy state continue I 
shall go to London 70 
'An accomodation was not to be reached, however , and Vassall 
departed for London, where he could Detter supervise his-
Jamaican estate than in the unsettled situation of America. 
Neither Rogers nor Vassall seems to have been motivated 
by a set of" political ideals. Their primary concern was that 
they be a,ble to carry on their own affairs 'with a minimum of 
interference. Rogers, for example , was a friend of the 
-37-
resistance so long as it did not threaten his business, and 
Vassall only went to England because the unsettled situation 
made the management of his affairs impractical in America. The 
loyalismof these merchants was much more pragmatically based 
than that of the "political" loyalists. What is common to both 
groups, however '. is that their opposition to the radica:.l.s came 
a .bout because the radicals~' tactics impinged upon their- activities , 
forcing 'them to ,choose one-side or the other~ For the -more 
stubborn merchants, ) .. ike _ Rogers, this moment came earlier 
than for_.:.ID.ore retiring ones! like VasSall, but at some point 
they all had to make a · choice based ' on their economic interests . 
The fact that the radicals'- ac-~ivitiesin ,the 1760's and early 
1770's were- most-directly challenging to the political leaders 
and merchants who lived iriBostbrl "and other port cities explains 
the predominance of these groups among the loyalists of this 
period. 
The transformation of the radicals ' goal from reform to 
revolution that began with the closing of Boston Harbor forced 
many of the men who were still hoping for someaccomodation 
to commit themselves- to one ,side or the other. At the same time , 
the spread of radicalism outside of the port towns exposed 
conservative men to increased scrutiny, criticism, and harass-
mente Thus, in this late phase of the prerevolutionary era 
moderate men who had so far avoided conflict with either side , 
and rural men who had not been involved in earlier issues were - .' - ". , "' .. . . . 
forced to choose sides over the question of American independence . 
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Samuel Quincy (Class af 1754) was, like same of the 
merchants, a man who straddled the fence as long as he 
could, in hopes that reason would prevail, and an accomodation 
be reached. Quincy was, at first, close to the radicals" position 
.and was elected to a committee to protest the appointment of 
. 71 
the Board of Customs in l76B. Yet, even at this date_he was 
fearful of the consequences of the political protests or the 
mobs. Writing to Joshua Bracket in August, 176B, he expressed 
concern that the public protests in America and England might 
result in the fall of one~ the other, or both countries~ Such 
an event would, he wrote, result. in the loss of the "most 
- . - 72 
inestimable treasure of the world." 
During the early 1710's Quincy's connections with t he 
administration were reinforced?'"..Jy his appointments as a: justice 
of the peace and solici·torgeneral. 73 However, he did not 
demonstrate the sarne commitment to the preservation of _.Bri tish 
authority that other provincial appointees did. His correspondence 
with his brother Josiah, a ·- member of the radicals' . circle, suggests 
the extent to which his loyalties were divided. In a letter 
written in 1774, Samuel lamented their differences and discussed 
the issues that divided them: 
The convulsion of the times is nothing more to be 
lamented, than the interruption of domestic harmony 
••. Our natural frame and constitutions, though cast 
in the same mold are not in all respects alike. 74-
While Samuel prefer-ed "ease and retirement'" he .rec99nized 
that his brother. was inclined through "zeal and fervor of 
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imagination, strength of genius & love of glory" to take 
part in the "turmoils of public action." These differences, he 
hoped could not be attributed to any "defect of conscience or 
uprightness of intention" on either of their parts. He closed 
the letter wi th this blessing of his -brother and hiscau-se: 
"God preserve you in health and longevity, the friend -:&-patron, 
d t 1 -- th th- f th f t" 75 an .a -eng ea er 0 your coun ry ... 
. While " Samuel Quincy could not ,bring himself to participate 
in the making of the American Revolution neither could he 
- ' 
,condemn it as loyalists- l-ike Selvall could. Preparing to leave 
Boston Lor England'in 1?75,,- he wrote to Henry Hill: " if I cannot 
love my country I whi-ch r shall endeavor to the utmost of my 
'. ',, ' 76 ' 
power, I will never betray it." Leaving the scene was his way 
: - .-
of ~1ithdrawing from the pres-sures of political division. After 
hearing. of the Battle of Bunker Hill he expressed his inability 
to take a stand. 
I lament it [the war) with most cordial affection for my 
native country and feel sensible for my friends. But I 
am aware it is my duty patiently to submit the event, 
as it maY , be governed by the all-wise councils ' of that 
being "who -rul,eth in the heavens and is the God of 
armies ..• "7? 
Quincy's-1Ilo.tivations differ from those of the other 
loyalists we have considered -so far. He was only concerned by 
the radicals ' tactics insofar as they endangered the British 
Empire and the political unity of Britain and America that this 
meant. He could not see an independent existence for ' either ' 
country. The dissolution of Anglo-American unity left --him in a 
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quandary over which side to support , and unable to choose one 
over the other, - he backed neither. Nonetheless, his position in 
favor of harmonious relations with Britain led him to identify 
himself with the loyalists in 1774, when he signed the lawyers ' 
farewell to Hutchinson and welcomed Gage. 
The increasingly clear division of the population over the 
issue of British authority helps to explain the emergence of a ' 
", - ~ 
number of rural ~ loyalists, particularly ministers, in the--:years 
after l773. -Unti1 - this time, - the imperial issues that embroiled 
Boston and other ports elicited only mild response in the rural 
communities -of ~?-saChusetts. 78 NOw, with the establishment- of 
a provincial congress and other bodies challenging the authority 
of the _provincial administration, the allegiances of the p.opulation 
:. ?"..;, -
were being_tested. The mi.nisters -of several towns seem to have 
been placed in a particu~arly uifficult situation by this devel-
opment. With.. the calling of ,a fast day by the provincial congress , 
they -we-re forced -to take a position, either recognizing Or denying 
the authority of this body to call such an action . 
Ebenezer -Sparhawk, the minister of Templeton and a graduate 
in the class of 1756, was one of the- men who refused to set a fast 
in 1774. This, combined with his pointed prayer for the King led 
the town to appoint a committee to express their displeasure with 
his- behavior. While he remained firm in his position, feelings 
were not so strong that he could not continue as the town's 
. . - . 
minister , which he did~79 As with seve:ra:l other ministers, - Sparhawk 
seems to have been involved in a certain amount of contention 
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with his community prior to the Revolution, suggesting that the 
question of loyalty was only the latest manifestation o£ a 
continuing dispute. For another of the ministers who first 
became identified as a loyalist as this time, Ebenezer. Morse~ 
this dispute had begun in 1745, when ·hedenied George ~ , .... ohitefield 
the use of the town meeting house, . and was continued oVer 
issues such as his attempt to introduce singing by note.-Sn , . .. . . . 
. . 
I-t"·- is hard to determine the reasonS for these minister.s_! _ 
, , ", 
loyali.sm,Out_tlieir reticence to acknowledge the authority .· 
of . the · :Provincial congi:-ess ·points to their support of estahTIshed 
authority, as does the .coI).sistentlyanti-revival stance of those 
who were old enough to have beeri irivolved in it. In this sense, 
_. 
they may be described asconse~;ratives. Their conservatism only 
became politically ·important at-':"'this late date, however, because 
it was only at this time that the radicals' tactic impinged 
uponthem.- Thus, their loyalism shares with the other loyalists 
the characteristic that it was only- expressed when the radicals 
forced them to choose between supporting them or opposing them. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although the Harvard graduates who became loyalists came 
from a wide range of social, economic and geographic backgrounds , 
they all enjoyed a ,privileged position in society as a result of 
their education. Their positions as political leaders, merchants 
and ministers meant that they Were frequently well placedt:o , ' 
,observe the public tumult provoked by the radical leaders.:'The 
way that they reacted to the disturbances created by the radicals 
may be characteriz-ed as "conservative," that is, their loyal:ism 
was motivated by a des-ire to protect the established politicaL 
order and-afearof the consequences of public protests. The 
bas'is of these conservative attitudes differed , however I ---depending 
,r' ' 
""-' 
upon the specific situation -of each individuaL. What has'emerged 
from the preceding consideration of the Harvard loyalists' 
perceptions of the issues surrounding the American Revolution is 
an understanding of how social, economic and geographic circurn-
stances were related to the form of these conservative attitudes , 
and the timing of their expression. 
The Harvard loyalists expressed their loyalism in reaction 
to the challenge that the radicals posed to them. As an examination 
of the ways in which loyalists became identified has shown, until 
,1774 ,these responses had nothing to do with opposing rebellion 
against Britain. It is only with hindsight that positions taken 
in the 1760's and early i770's can be identified as signs of 
loyalism. The division of political leaders into groups of future 
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loyalists and revolutionaries began in the early l760 '- s -and con -
tinued until the outbreak of war. Initially, the men who would 
become loyalists were familiar with politics, and responded to 
radical challenges within the framework of existing domestic 
political disputes. They believed that they were protecting the 
established political order from the danger posed by popular-poli-
tical leaders. They sawthemE!elves as the proper- guardians of 
"public vi!'tue·,·' profecting the greater good of the community 
.f:rom what they believed to be the selfish aims of their political 
opponents. 
Merchants with litt~e or no political involvement came to 
oppose the radicals later, beginning in the late 1760s. They were 
not reacting to .specific poli tical .:;~ctions , but to the radicals' 
interference in fJ:.ee trade. They wished to carryon business with 
as little distur.bance as possible from either side. Yet as the 
non-importation movement grew it began to seem more threatening 
to them than British regulations. Although the merchants and 
political conservatives shared a fear of the radicals' public 
protests, they did not recognize the . identity of their interests 
for some time. As long as both groups were responding to the 
particular threats that the radica.-ls posed to them, their __ g.oals 
were not clearly unified. Only when the radicals came to favor 
revolution were the merchants and political leaders unified by 
their opposition to American independence. 
In 1774, the-domestic issues that ' divided the future loyalists 
and revolutionaries were translated into 'the imperial issue of 
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American independence. This new understanding of. the division of 
society forced a number of moderate men, who had so far avoided 
identification with either side, to declare their allegiances. 
Prior to this time, they had been able to maintain connections with 
both sides in the domestic political disputes, or to remain aloof 
from these disputes. These men only reluctantly identified. them-
selves as loyalists, in 1774/because of their belief that Anglo,,":, 
American unity was essential to the stability of their society. As 
long as the existence of the British Empire 'had not been ~tened, 
- .. ... 
. ' '. . - . .. : .". . . --" 
they were ~ble to -avoid taking a stand on domestic issues, ,-but 
the clarity with which independence became the radicals'goal 
after 1774~ made it impossible for them to remain neutral any longer. 
Another group of men who had not been forced to take-a stand 
.. ~ '": 
- ~ . 
in earlier disputes was also confronted with the choice of supporting' 
or opposing rebellion... in the years immediately preceding the 
Revolution. The spread of revolutionary organizing to previously 
quiescent·-rural communities, in 1774, forced the residents of these 
communities to take sides as well. At this time, the focus -of 
attention shifted from local, to provincial and imperial issues, 
as the spread of non-importation agreements outside of Boston, and 
the formation of local committees of correspondence suggests. As 
· this shift occurred, the residents of rural communities were faced, 
for the first time, with the choice of which side to support. Some 
men, motivated by their respect for established authority, ~pposed 
the raditais' efforts. 
The number of rural men who joined the loyalists was small, 
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however, compared to the number of urban political leaders and 
merchants who became identified as loyalists. The short time 
span in which the rural loyalists could be identified, combined 
with growing public pressure to support the Revolution suggests 
that the number of rural loyalists may not be reflective -of the -
number of rural men with conservative attitudes. After 17T4:,events 
moved qu-ickly towards outright war, and the supporters of royal 
government _~:)Utside7:-of Boston became increasingly isolated from 
:Bri tish pr()-tection, -as the countryside became Inoreradical. 
- Expressions -"of their loyali;smexposed them to harassment and abuse , 
from -which th-ey_-could expect little: protection. The rural men 
who became loyalists in the y~ars -_- immediately before the Revolution 
may be just the most visible -- part of a much larger group. 
This pattern of progressive _reaC;±ion to the radicals' challenges 
helps to -explain the strong urban, political and commercial bias 
that_we have found among the Harvard loyalists, as other scholars 
have found more generally. The re1atj:,ve numbers of urban and rural , 
political and non-political loyalists reflect the extent of 
involvement of these groups in the domestic disputes that grew intp 
the American Revolution. Since the radicals ' efforts were primarily 
focused in urban areas prior to 177-4, most loyalists were urban men, 
reacting to events close to home. Since the radicals' major challenges , 
in this time period, were directed against the political and business 
establishments, it was largely political leaders and merchants who-
responded to them. Only after 1773 and -1774, whem the issue became 
revolution instead of resistance , were moderate merchants , political 
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leaders, and residents of rural communities , all previously 
uninvolved in domestic 'disputes, forced to make a choice. At this 
point, some of the men \vho valued continued unity, sided with 
the men who had earlier opposed the radicals, becoming identified 
collectively as loyalists because -of their shared opposition to 
- ~ . 
The fact that the loyali-st~ :were, on the whole , . rea:cth:~g 
,to the radicals I initiatives also helps to explain the weaJ"ne.ss 
of the IqY?liist. s'ide which has been noted by other historians. 
", 
Since the .men who -would become loy,alists 'Wereini tially responding 
,~ , ', .. ' 
to different , issues, they·· did not see themselves as·, a unified 
group. Political leaders believed ,that they were acting to protect 
the greater good of the commu~ity, while merchants were mostly 
concerned--wi th the interference of the mob in free trade. Thus, 
prior to 1774 no .·unified leadership developed as a viable alternative 
to the radicals. After this time, the radicals' challenge extended 
far beyond domestic disputes, attacking the British Empire itself , 
and the outnumbered loyalists, seeing themselves as just one part 
of this larger body opposing the radicals' goal of American indepen-
dence, looked to Britain for leadership. The failure of men with 
conservative attitudes to assume leadership of the loyalist cause 
is ,underscored by the fact that we have observed this failure 
among the college-educated elite of New England. If Harvard 
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graduates, who were frequently the recognized leaders of their 
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HARVARD GRADUATES BORN AND LIVING IN BOSTo.N 
Born :in Boston Living in Boston 
No. ·0£ %of No. of % of . 
Classes grads. grads. grads. grads. 
1722-33 91 20..0. 94 . 20..6 
1734-44 89 24.4 64 17.5 
1745-55 59 21.1 53 19.0. 
1756-64 42 12.0. 53 15.1 
1765-71 37 10.6 45 12.9 
Total 3:1:-8 17.7 30.9 17.2 
Notes: Information on birthplac~ and residences of Harvard 
graduates -frOID Sibley and Shipton t Sibley's Harvard Graduates. 











15 t o.57 
15,520. 
Boston as a 
% of Mass. 
12.6 
6.47 
Source: Adapted from Nash t pp. 407-40.9; and G~eehe and 
Harrington , pp. 15, 21 -22 . 
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TABLE III 
OCCUPATIONS OF HARVARD GRADUATES: 1722-1771 
Merchants Lawyers Physicians Row Totals 
% of % of % of % of 
Classes No. grads. _No. grads. .No. grads. :No. grads. 
1722-33 90 19.7 29 6.4 53 11.6 1-72 37.7 
1734-44 42 11.5 17 4.7 47 12.9 106 29.1 




1756-64 68 - "9 -4 ...':-_ ,:--l .. ' 56 16.0 49 14.0 173 49.4 
1765-71 · 52 . 14.9 51 14.6 65 18.6 168 48.0. 
- . .. 
Total .)08 17 ~1 183 -10.2 255 14.2 746 41.4 
Notes: Information on these 'occupations is-from Sibley and 
Shipton . It -was not ,however, '- po~sible to determine thE; number . . 
of ministers in each class from this source . Data on ministers 
in selected- classes ispresented :·~below. 
No. of % of 
Class Ministers grads. 
1725 20 42.6 
1750 7 )6.8 
1760 7 25.9 
1770 11 32.4 
"Total 45 35.4 
Source: Adapted from Lawrence A. Cremin, American Education: 
The Colonial Experience, 1607-1783. (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1970), p . 554. 
"CA."Mflftl12~l:< ...... ... , . 
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TABLE IV 
BIRTHPLACES AND RESIDENCES OF THE HARVARD 
LOYALISTS BY DISTANCE FROM BOSTON 
B~rthplace Residence 
36' '24~2' I', 88~6 .. . '. , '. ) 
~.-J-1e .. ~~- .,~~"jJ " .. 9_~,JJL[ ... .9J..._ 
o 0.0 100.0 
* Does not include ::30ston or Camoridge·. 
. • I ** Does not ~nclude Salem 
Noltes: This table is based on the result$ of a statistical atuAyof the 
biographies of 160 loyalists who attende~ Harvard.' in SOhnL'. ·Sibleyand Clifford K • 
. Shipton. Sibley' sHarvard Graduates; 1'7 vola: (Boerton: MasS~chuEletts Historical Society I 







HARVARD LOYALISTS' BIRTHPLACES BY THEIR 
FATHERS· . OCCUPATIONS 
. , ""; ' 
I . . . 







RELATIVE CLASS RANK OF THE HARVARD LOYALISTS 
.",,~,., .. ,. ' ... ' ' .. ' ........... , ' ·· .. R. E.L('Ap·EcT.1r·.·.V)·.EAUJ
e
' .• pU,····EcS:QTrE.)·O, "F',;1ll1J .. '.'·p·: .... ··'C·.··~·,'-·:MTrI.:.'·.·~·):.~~.',.'.:.'.'~ ···'·'···Assocd'It::·· . FR Q FRBE! .. '. 
£ATEG ORY LABEL FREQ 
90 ... 99 PER C~E~N::!..TkI~l,.JE"-=-,,,,,,,,,,~,,,,,,,,,,,,-,,,,,,,4..j~2 ...--:...+_~. ~2~O!,..l • ~O~·'.7"7"ST"~Z Q~ .. ,.;~0!4:· """-"-"'7/.'-T.?-~;gjj 
'·~'0-.89~;·C:ENttL~ , ···<25i',:11.~,b ". "···""'1,$ .. 6';'~~~;'i:'i-~Ii 
_~Q;"'79 ,.PERCENfiLE',': ~.' '.1'-8:.::11.3 .. It ,;;3 ··'",,4~.'·:~ 
6()-... o9 PERCENTILE 18, 11.3 11.3 5~:.f~:C:~:' 
50 .. 59 PE'RCt:NTH.E' 't'O> b. 3 b. 3 
"4~~49 c ~E'~CE'NtTt:E,' . . , ;: t~h!': >7:~S'7,,,5 
; ~~';". .. <'. 
_,_3{)~j9PE~c:~~!if"t,;,'r;-,:'; -:'~" ';l¥f'~;, ' , '0,.;9: .• ·_·'·.'·'~.....;.;....'b~,.9 ~~~ 
20-2'1 PERilCNTIlE."ij 5.6 :.:!~~'1l~ 
. !;; 1~@~t~~~~tt~~10-?'41~&j~i-li!~1~~~;i~)~~ 
, --~:..:. '~-: - .-.=- " . .... -'. 
Notes: Since class sizes varied .... ,a great deal during the 
.#. 
eighteenth' century, I have .computed the per'centile- rank 
of each loya-list by di vi'ding position in the class by the 
size of the class. -Thus,' in a hypotheticalclas.s of 100 
students, .those with percentile ranks of 80 to 89 wO}lld . 
have .he,en ranked be.tweenten and twenty places from the ·top 
of their class. 
The table is based on the loyalist sample . 
TABLE VII 
I 
CROSSTABULATION 'OF THE HARVARD LOYALISTS· CLASS RANK 
. WITH THEIR FATHERS' OCCUPATIONS 
Notes: Class rank has been normalized in this table by dividi~g actua;l position 
,in the class by the size of the class. 








COMPARISON OF HARVARD LOYALISTS ' OCCUPATIONS 
WITH THOSE OF THEIR FATHERS 
Loyalists Fathers 
% of % of 
Occupation NOI. Loyalists No. Fathers 
Minister 34 23·9 24 23 .. 5 
Merchant 45 31.7 23 22.6 
Lawyer 27 19.0 2 1.9 
Physicia."1 17 12.0 7 6. -? 
Retail & Craft 4 2.8 19 18.6 
Notes : Based on informati.onfrom the loyalist sample .. 
TAfiLE IX 
HARVARD LOYALIS~S' RESIDENCES BY THEIR ~IRTHPLACES 





~ .. ' ......... : 
.-62-
TABLE X 
OCCUPATIONS OF THE HARVARD LOYALISTS 
-.:.-.-: ...... ::~ .~" """ ' - , . . _-"' ,,' ,", ..... . : :-:: .• ; '.;=:!--- - ~~-:-
. . ' ... Fe ·,:::~;~.:.;;:c· i ,:" :;; :~;~·;,: ·:~ RElAJ:lJLE ~SI£D$ 
.. ~ ,~ ' .ABSOLUTE .· FREQ ' FREQ>.: 
CATEGOR~ LABEC ' "':'-~ ~ ' /: fREQ< . . (PCT) . (PCll.' .. 
- ": -1 :.; .. ::,. .. . ::; . - ' .. ~ : .".- ,---~~:-~;.-
MIN IS T FR...~ . '. . " .:" <>~" ',g - . 2 L •. ,i,....-"..-=.,......c;;..,..o..~~ 
. ·: MERC~.g.f41 · :?h: ':" .>;~ : ... ·· f ·~~· '7~~:j't ::" 4S ':':~ . . . 28.l ... ' '. ",,' 
~ ~.LA.~'_-'~ .·>' .··,:~; · .; .. : ; . . 3}~~·i,,' i· ::, 'io ',; . · 18.: ~' :' ,. 
o •• ~: '. ';'. , ." = , 
PHYSICJAi'l : 'c·::,: " }.;.d8 · ' 11.3 
_ EO!JCATQR < ·: " · ···~·;' 1 .. . 9.£l ~" 
." . _' .... '.... ~.'.:.~.::~.~ ::-~ _, :. . . . - __ .::x: ::...:¥: ~ ' ; ~ . ', . 
. " : -- :';.' _ .; -.;' '-~-:: ' - ':'-~~;~:~}::'.;'.-- .. : .- .'~ ... ".: 
RETA It, CR~FI.. . .., ", "''''=< : ~.. !:: . >J~~~~fii{ 
. -,:! _ .. _ - '. 8 8 ;:--' :M'iSS'IN'S:·.·:--
i02:0~,.·:/if~i~~~·"\1 
;,.:.. .~:.":" :;rlr,:>··.'.:  :" :\'''.£· ·~;·~S,:(~·~· ';~' ':~~; 
Notes: Based on the loyalist sample . 
TABLE XI 
HARVARD LOYALfSTS' OCCUPATIONS BY 
THOSE OF THEIR FATHERS · 







PUBLIC OFFICE HOLDING AMONG THE HARVARD LOYALISTS 
Type of No, of % of 
* Office LOY.'alists Loyalists 
Town leader 23 14.4 
Representative _-,32 20.0 .-: ' 
Minor Town Office -_- :32 20.0 
Royal Appointment -: 21 13·1 , -
Provincial Appt. 23 14.4 . ... ~ ,--
Held No -Office -82 51·3 
*' Does not -add to 100 because 'of muTtiple office holding 
Notes :-:Based-on informatiotifrom -the loyalist sample • 
. ~--
TA~~E XIII 
! _ t 
HARVARD LOYALISTS' GOVERNMENT POSITIONS. 
. I ·' . i 
BY THEIR bCCUPATIONS 






DATE OF FIRST LOYALIST ACTION 






CHARACTERI~TICS OF LOYALISTS IDENTIFIED . 
IN DlFFERENT YEARS 
Public Office Holding 
I , 
Town . Royal Provincial Justice of No 
Number Elected Appointed Appointect the 'Peace Office 
* ' -l~ * ~ * %* Years Identified No. % No. % No. % No. '% No. 
I 
1761-67 20 8 40.0 9 45.0 8 40.0 11 55.0 4 20. 0 
1768-71 19 6 31.6 1 '. 5,3 :s 26.3 9 '47 .4 8 42.1 . 
1772-73 16 8 50.0 4 25~O 6 37.5 12 75.0 3 18.8 
1774-75 53 11 20.8 4 7. 5 " 11 20.0 19 35.8 23 43.4 
1776-77 6 0 0.0 b 0.0 I 1 16.7 0 0.0 5 83.3 
Total ·114 43 37. 7 18 15.8 31 27.2 51 44.7 43 37.7 
*Percentage of the Hart,:"ard loyalists who became identified in each period. 
Percentages do not add to lOb along the rows because of multiple G>ffice holding. 















CHARACTERISTICS OF LOYALISTS IDENTIFIED 
IN DIFFERENT YEARS 
Number of Anglican and Congregationalist 
Ministers identified-in Each Period 
Anglicans Congregationalists 
* '* No. % No. % 
3 15.0 0 0.0 
1 5·3 2 10.5 
-0 0.0 0 0.0 
2 3 . 8 4 7.6 
1 L6..( 4 66.7 










*Percentage of all Harvard loyaJ....i,sts that became identified 
.",. 
in eacli period . 






CLASSIFICATION OF LOYALIST ACTIONS 
The Harvard graduates who became loyalists identified 
themselves through a wide variety of actions. This appendix is 
included to clarify the ways in which these 'actions have been 
categorized in Table XIV. A selectedgrouJ? qf the actions .that 
were included in each category is shown below. 
Status Quo 
*Protested '..a town ·ineetl.ng proposal critical of Britain 
*Urged no~·:r:es-istance ·to British military force 
*QPposeds~uggling 
. Weak 
*Opposedto political excesses .of radicals 
. . .. .. ... 
*Upset by popular ~olence . 
*<:;arried on ' correspondence critical of radicals 
*.Couldn I t supp.Q;rt ei ther side 
*Suspected of loyalism bya ··committee of safety or inspection, 
.or other radical political group 
Criticized Radicals 
*Wrote critically of Stamp ' Act Riots 
*Wrote critically of the Boston Tea Party 
*Expressed criticism of radicalS' cause or le~ders 
*Challenged authority of the provincial cOngress 
A-2 
Political Opposition 
*Voted in House of Representatives -to rescind the Circular Letter 
*Supported those voting to rescind the Ci+",cular Letter 
*Protested town meeting support of a tea boycott 
*Favored crown salaries for the Governor and judges 
Resisted the -Popular Movement 
"" , .: 
*Supported issuing writs of assi~tance 
*Supported Stamp Act 
*Was placed in conflict with popular protests as a result o f offici al 
duties 
,' . , 
*Imported British ~goods -despite boycott 
*Accepted sala~yfrom - royal go~ermnent. for -appointed office 
*Resisted popular efforts to closet'~ courts 
*Refused to sanction fas_t called by provincial congress 
Self-Proclaimed 
*Associated with British officers 
*Associated with other loyalists 
*Signed farewell statement to Hutchinson and/or letter of welcome 
or farewell to General Gage 
*Refused to omit prayers for the King 
*Refused to sign oath of allegiance to new government after 177-6 
" A-3 
Royal Appointee 
*Appointed stamp distributor 
*Appointed to Vice Admiralty Court 
*Appointed to Mandamus · Council 
Direct Action" 
*Aided British Army 
*Enlisted in -royalist reg1ment 
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Primary Sources 
The letters and diaries · oi · several of the Harvard loyaliats 
. .' ~. 
were availa:bl~e in published form. Two of these were particularly 
useful. 
Oliver, Fitch Edward, ed. The Diary of Williampynchon :of Salem. 
Boston! . Houghton Mifflin and Company, The Riverside Press, 1890. 
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particularly the Quincy I Wendell, Holmes and Upham Paper-s ,..which 
are available on microfilm. William Vassall's Letter Book 7 Micro. 
PN 105, was another source of much -useful inforination. 
